We consider a model of vertical competition where downstream firms (retailers) purchase an upstream input from a monopolist and are able to differentiate from each other in terms of quality. Our primary focus is to study the effects of introducing a large retailer, such as a WalMart Supercenter, that is able to lower wholesale prices (i.e. buyer market power). We obtain two main results. First, the store with no buyer market power responds to the presence of the large retailer by increasing its quality, a finding that is consistent with recent efforts by traditional retailers to enhance shoppers' buying experience (i.e. quality). Second, the presence of a large retailer causes consumer welfare to increase. There are, however, two reasons for the increase in consumer welfare: consumers gain from the large retailer's low price (because the upstream discount is partially passed on to the retail price) as well as from the high quality level offered by the traditional retailer. Contrary to the conventional wisdom most of the consumer welfare gains seem due to the latter. The intuition for this result is that price competition softens substantially as a result of firms' quality differentiation. We also investigate the effects of buyer market power on retail and wholesale prices as well as on producer welfare. 
Introduction
For decades, researchers and policy makers have been concerned with the negative effects of imperfect markets in the food industry. Most of the attention has focused on seller concentration and its association with higher prices, reduced consumer surplus, and larger profits. Under this "unidirectional" market power approach, downstream agents (buyers) play a passive role by accepting the price set by upstream firms. However, recent concentration trends in downstream markets (i.e. food processors and retailers) require a closer look at the existence and effects of buyer market power; ignoring bidirectional market power can produce biased results when analyzing important policy questions, such as how welfare is affected by mergers or by the presence of large retail chains.
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Unlike other inputs such as energy, oil or labor, agricultural products are either purchased in raw form by final consumers or are transformed (processed) in some way. These characteristics make buyer market power especially relevant in agricultural markets. For example, agricultural products are often sold to a handful of firms that specialize in processing it; this is notably reflected by the consolidation of food processors as buyers of farmers' outputs. In addition, a large fraction of fresh produce output is channeled through large and increasingly dominant retail chains: in 2005 food sales by the four largest retailers at the national level was 35.5% while food sales by the four largest retailers in a local metropolitan area was, on average, More specifically, the ubiquitous negative connotation that market power is given may need to be reconsidered by antitrust legislators and policy makers as buyer market power may, for example, help consumers buy at lower prices (Dobson et al, 2001 ). 1 The two most commonly used terms in the literature are buyer market power and countervailing market power. We employ the former as it is more intuitive when referring to a buyer's ability to push upstream prices down (whether it emerges from lack of competition among buyers or simply because the seller has an inherent superior "negotiating" ability). In this paper we assume there is buyer market power, without seeking to explain its existence.
72.3% (ERS, 2000; . 2 Being the largest retailer in the United States, Wal-Mart's 2008 revenues were more than the total combined revenues of the next six U.S. retailers (Kroger, Costco, Home Depot, Target, Walgreen, and CVS Caremark; Schultz, 2009) . Among other things, Wal-Mart is known for its low prices: 8-27% lower than conventional retailers (Hausman and Leibtag, 2007) . In addition, Volpe and Lavoie (2008) show that in response to a Wal-Mart Supercenter's presence, competing supermarkets lower their prices by 6% to 7% lower for national brands and by 3% to 8% for private labels.
Importantly, mass merchandisers (e.g. Wal-Mart, Target and Kmart) and warehouse clubs (e.g. Costco and Sam's) are capturing an ever larger share of all food retail sales in the United States. Among these merchandisers, Wal-Mart can be a particularly pivotal buyer to food manufacturers. Notable examples in the food industry are Procter & Gamble, Heinz, and Kraft, who earn at least 10 percent of their annual revenue from sales to Wal-Mart (Hopkins, 2003) . 3 Moreover, competing supermarkets have tended to increase the quality of the shopping experience by including amenities such as delis, on-site bakeries, coffee shops, gas stations, banks, pharmacies etc. (Volpe and Lavoie, 2008) as well as introducing high-end private-label brands. 4 In this paper, we develop a model to study the effects of the presence of a large retailer with buyer market power. Specifically, we consider a simple wholesaler-retailer relationship After years of decline brought on by fighting Wal-Mart on price, supermarkets appear to be finding a way to win shoppers back by "sharpening their difference with Wal-Mart's price-obsessed supercenters, stressing less-hectic stores with exotic or difficultto-match products and greater convenience" (McWilliams, 2007) . 2 The second Figure ( 72.3%) corresponds to 1998. 3 Other effects of Wal-Mart's presence are discussed by Basker (2007) and references therein. 4 A recent study by Bonanno and Lopez (2009) also shows that retailers differentiate themselves from competitors and attract less price-sensitive consumers by service competition in fluid milk markets.
where retailers buy a good from a monopolist wholesaler and then sell it (without processing) to final consumers (in the remainder of the paper the terms "wholesaler", "manufacturer" and "upstream firm" are used interchangeably). The application we have in mind is the entry of WalMart Supercenters, which, with their full line of grocery products, compete with traditional supermarkets (in the remainder of the paper the terms "retailer", "supermarket", "store" and "downstream firm" are used interchangeably). For tractability purposes we focus on duopoly competition downstream, namely there is one conventional retailer (i.e. with no buyer market power) and the other with buyer market power (e.g. Wal-Mart).
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We compare our equilibrium results to two "no-Wal-Mart" retail configurations: monopoly and duopoly. This allows us to evaluate the effect of Wal-Mart's entry (either by addition or substitution of a retailer) on: 1) consumer and producer welfare, and 2) the price and quality equilibrium levels. In the absence of a large retailer, the two conventional retailers set their quality at the same level and compete with each other in a standard Bertrand fashion.
Though the profits for both retailers are zero, the wholesaler (as well as consumers) benefit from the intense price competition between retailers. In the presence of a large retailer, conversely, the degree of quality differentiation depends on the size of the discount (i.e. market power) obtained by the retailer: as the discount gets larger, the large retailer has a higher incentive to lower prices Buyer market power is measured by a discount rate negotiated between the manufacturer and the retailer, and assumed to be exogenous in our model. As opposed to earlier work, a key component of our model is that it allows downstream firms to compete not only in prices but also in quality: retailers can choose a different level of "service" (i.e., quality of the shopping experience). and a decreased incentive to increase quality; on the other hand, the conventional retailer responds by offering a high-quality/high-priced product.
We find that consumer welfare increases because some consumers with a strong preference for quality benefit from the high-quality/high-price combination offered by the conventional retailer, while some consumers with weaker preference for quality benefit from low-quality/low-price combination offered by the large retailer. However, the first effect is much larger, suggesting that increases in consumer welfare stemming from lower prices might be smaller than usually claimed. A second finding is that producer welfare (i.e. the joint profits of upstream and downstream firms) also increases in the presence of a large retailer. The main reason for this is that the presence of a large retailer allows the wholesaler to reap the benefits of price discrimination between the two retailers. Importantly, producer welfare gains are larger than consumer welfare gains.
The paper is organized as follows. We briefly discuss prior work related to our research in section 2. The model and the main results are presented in section 3. Section 4 presents robustness checks of our model and section 5 provides concluding remarks, limitations and suggestions for further research.
Related Studies
There are several prior studies on buyer market power, with different focus (i.e. empirical vs. theoretical) as well as with different research scopes. However, there have been very few attempts to incorporate product differentiation in the analysis.
An issue related to our work that has been analyzed conceptually is whether increased buyer market power by a downstream firm that counteracts seller market power upstream translates into a lower price for the final good. The canonical model considers bilateral market power with a single manufacturer bargaining with competing retailers over the price of a homogeneous good. Dobson and Waterson (1997) and von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, retail prices can sometimes increase (and welfare decrease) with retailer concentration. Chen (2003) assumes a dominant firm structure in the retail market and shows that as the bargaining power of the retailer increases, consumers face lower retail prices. Erutku (2005) relaxes the assumption of a homogeneous product sold by retailers by assuming a degree of substitutability between a national retailer's good and the same good sold by a local retailer. Results of the model are ambiguous as retail prices may increase or decrease with the degree of buyer market power by the national retailers. Brekke and Straume (2004) also study horizontal product differentiation in the context of bilateral monopoly. Their approach, however, is to study how bargaining affects the degree of product differentiation downstream and find that downstream firms increase product heterogeneity as the supplier's bargaining power increases.
The buyer market power literature has investigated a variety of other issues that are beyond the scope of this paper. For a broader perspective, the interested reader is referred to Dobson et al (2001) and Snyder (2008) . Dobson et al (and references therein) offer an empirical and practical overview of buyer market power; the authors focus on the increased concentration of the retail sector in Europe and discuss the implications that the resulting buyer market power by retailers can have for several competition and policy issues. Snyder, on the other hand, provides a concise overview of theoretical work.
Model
We adopt a three-stage game: in stage 1, retailers select the level of service (quality) to provide. In stage 2, the wholesale price to each retailer is determined either through a manufacturer's take-it-or-leave-it offer if the retailer has no buyer market power or through bargaining between the manufacturer and retailer. As a result, the wholesale price depends on the degree of the retailer's buyer market power. In stage 3, retailers compete and simultaneously set retail prices to consumers.
Setup
In this section we model the wholesaler-retailer relationship where retailers buy a product from a wholesaler and sell it to consumers. Consider one manufacturer with (seller) market power offering an identical product to two retailers who compete in prices. Retailers are differentiated in the level of service they provide to consumers, i.e., quality of the shopping experience. We model this vertical differentiation à la Mussa and Rosen (1978) . Consumers are heterogeneous in their valuation of quality given by θ . The conditional indirect utility of a consumer with a marginal willingness to pay θ for quality k and income y is given by y k p θ + − if one unit of the product of quality k is purchased at price p, and by y if the product is not purchased. We assume a continuum of consumers with total mass of one distributed uniformly over a unit interval (i.e., [0 
Let L θ denote the consumer who is indifferent between buying the low-quality product and not buying at all, where the subscript L denotes the low-quality product. θ θ ∈ will buy the high-quality product. Accordingly, the demand for each quality is the length of the consumer interval buying the given quality multiplied by the density of consumers along that interval times the total number of consumers, N=1, for illustrative convenience. As a result, the demands for the low-and high-quality products are:
We consider a three-stage game. In stage 1, retailers select k H and k L , the levels of service (quality) to provide. In stage 2, the wholesale price (w) to each retailer is determined either through a manufacturer's (or wholesaler's) take-it-or-leave-it offer if the retailer has no buyer market power or through bargaining between the manufacturer and retailer. In stage 3, retailers simultaneously set p H and p L . The subgame perfect equilibrium is solved by backward induction.
In this model, Wal-Mart (i.e. the large retailer) has buyer market power and can obtain a discount ( )
on the wholesale price, w. The size of the discount is determined through bargaining, which is assumed to be exogenous to the problem. The larger is γ , the larger is the bargaining (i.e. buyer) power of Wal-Mart. This formulation allows us to nest a "no-Wal-Mart" case ( 0 γ = ) and a Wal-Mart case into a single specification. The maximization problem of the retailers (stage 3) can be expressed as
where π denotes profit and ( ) C • is the cost of quality improvement. 0 γ = when the lowquality retailer is a conventional supermarket, and 0 γ > when the low-quality retailer is WalMart. This formulation assumes that the retailer incurs only the costs of buying the product from the manufacturer and its quality improvement. The quality improvement cost function is assumed to be cubic and does not vary with the quantity of products being sold. 
( 1) 1 , 3
We employ a cubic cost function because alternatives (such as a quadratic setting) involve too many corner solutions. The cubic cost function also provides the necessary convexity. The cost functional form plays an important role in determining the equilibrium; however, the qualitative properties of our conclusions, discussed in section 4, are robust to other cost specifications. Taking the first-order condition on price for each retailer and solving for the retail prices we
These prices can be substituted into the retailers' demands (equations 1 and 2) to find the aggregate demand for the manufacturer. That is,
The manufacturer maximizes profits from sales to the low-quality retailer (at a discount or not)
and from sales to the high-quality retailer by choosing w (stage 2). This maximization problem can be expressed as:
This formulation assumes that the manufacturer does not incur costs. It is straightforward to relax this assumption later. From this maximization problem we obtain the manufacturer's price given by ( )
which can be substituted back into the retail demands and prices to solve for the optimal quality choices by both retailers. The maximization problem of retailers in stage 1 corresponds to
where w is defined in equation (3). From (4) and (5) we obtain the equilibrium quality, and thus equilibrium prices and quantities. This stage of the model is solved with numerical methods given the non-linearity of the expressions.
By solving equations (4) and (5), we can see that the optimal levels of k L and k H are functions of γ and c L . That is, in addition to the low-quality retailer's coefficient of quality improvement cost (c L ), the optimal quality levels also depend on the discount rate γ, which is the measure of buyer market power. Therefore, varying γ from 0 (a conventional supermarket with no bargaining power) to a positive number (Wal-Mart has a superior bargaining position against a manufacturer) allows us to evaluate the effect of buyer market power on prices, quality levels, and welfare.
In the simulation, we first assume the low-quality retailer's coefficient of quality improvement cost is equal to one (c L = 1) and vary the discount rate γ from 0 to 1 by 0.1 increments. For comparison purposes, we also consider the case in which there is only a conventional retailer in the market (next section, 3.2); we call this "base case 1" (B1). Section 3.3 discusses the two-retailer case with 0 γ = , which is labeled as "base case 2" (B2). The tworetailer case with [0.1,1] γ ∈ is discussed in section 3.4; we label this the "Wal-Mart" case (WM). 
Base Case 1 (B1): One Conventional Store
When there is one conventional retailer in the market, the maximization problems of the retailer and the manufacturer can be written, respectively, as: 
where the subscript B1 stands for "base case 1" (in parentheses for manufacturer's profits) and the coefficient of quality improvement cost (c) is assumed to be 1. The corresponding equilibrium is given by: 
The second row of Table 1 With two conventional stores, we assume that no retailer receives a discount from the manufacturer, i.e. they have no buying power ( 0 γ = ). Note that both retailers set their quality level higher than 1 even though they receive zero profits. To understand why retailers want to improve their quality, let us look at Figure 1 -a payoff matrix of strategies in stage 1. Given that the competitor chooses not to improve quality, the retailer's best response is to improve its own quality; conversely, if the competitor decides to improve quality, the retailer is indifferent between improving and not improving quality.
Therefore, (k L > 1, k H > 1) are weakly dominant strategies, implying that both retailers slightly improve their quality (from 1 to 1.0004) in stage 1. While profits are zero for retailers under both Since both retailers operate at the same quality level, we cannot label low-and high-quality retailers, but we still refer to them as L and H for notational convenience. Market demand is 0.5, which is split equally between two retailers.
Comparing B2 with B1, we find that the quality level as well as wholesale and retail prices decrease; meanwhile, the market demand doubles (from 0.25 to 0.5). In addition, consumer surplus and wholesaler profits increase while total retailer profits decreases. The total welfare gains stem entirely from increased retailer competition on prices. One can think of this result as an analogue to the standard double marginalization problem (without quality competition): a lower degree of market power in a stage of the supply chain (in this case the retail level) reduces the double marginalization problem thereby increasing overall profits and consumer surplus. This comparison suggests that the entry of a conventional retailer to a market currently being served by a similar (conventional) store will trigger intense price competition (and virtually no quality competition) thereby unambiguously benefiting consumers.
Wal-Mart case (WM):
One Conventional Store and One "Wal-Mart" Store: γ > 0
In this case, one of the retailers in the B2 case above is replaced by a retailer that has access to a positive discount γ > 0 (e.g., Wal-Mart). In Table 1 (rows 5 through 14) we report results for γ∈ [0.1, 1] in 0.1 intervals.
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The quality level set by the low-quality retailer (i.e. Wal-Mart) has an interesting pattern (Figure 2 ). When the discount rate obtained from the wholesaler is small (γ = 0.1), compared to B2, Wal-Mart has an incentive to increase its quality (k L = 1.0441 > 1.0004) and to charge higher prices (p L =0.5823 > 0.5002). As the discount rate gets larger, Wal-Mart finds it more effective to attract customers through a lower price (for Results in Table 1 lead to several important observations. ). Intuitively, for a large enough discount rate (i.e. 0.1 γ > ) the profitability incentive to offer low prices overcomes the profitability incentive to attract customers via high quality.
In response to Wal-Mart's low price policy, the high-quality retailer chooses to differentiate its product/service by significantly improving the quality level above that observed
, see Figure 2 ), although not always above the quality level of 1.25 observed in B1. Intuitively, because of its inability to obtain a discount, the conventional retailer is at a disadvantage when trying to compete in prices with Wal-Mart; instead it chooses to augment its profitability by increasing its quality level.
All prices (wholesale, w, as well as retail, p L and p H ) exhibit a non-monotonic relationship with the discount rate γ (see Figure 3) . The initial price increases are due to the initial intense quality competition that retailers engage in: a relatively small bargaining power by the low-quality retailer makes both firms focus their competition on quality which results in higher equilibrium prices. Conversely, as larger discount rates are achieved prices tend to fall because: a) the quality levels offered by firms tends to drop (Figure 2 all consumers pay a lower price than in B2.
Interestingly, a portion of the purchase discount for the low-quality retailer is always passed on to consumers. This can be seen in Figure 3 : p L < w, which implies that the fraction (wp L )/ w γ of the discount w γ is passed on to consumers (Figure 4 ). The pass-through rate, (w -
γ , is decreasing in γ, which implies that more buyer market power allows the low-quality retailer to retain a larger fraction of the discount (and therefore enjoy more profits). Consistently, the markup of the low-quality retailer, In terms of profits, the manufacturer prefers a relatively low discount rate, i.e. in the [0.1, 0.4] range, relative to B2 (see Figure 7) . The intuition for this result is that it is in this range where product differentiation is maximal (see Figure 2 ) and therefore more profitable for a monopolistic manufacturer to engage in price discrimination. The low-quality retailer enjoys greater profits at higher discounts (as its ability to gain additional customers is enhanced) whereas the high-quality retailer prefers a low discount rate as it enjoys higher prices ( Figure 3) as well as larger demand ( Figure 5 ).
Comparing profits with B2, a manufacturer prefers competition between quality differentiated retailers (WM) as long as the discount is not too large (i.e. when it can profitably engage in price discrimination). However, it may actually prefer double marginalization (B1) if the discount rate is too large. Because price competition softens in WM, retailers' profits are larger (greater than zero) than in B2 and, for 0.7 γ > , joint retailers' profits are greater than in the B1.
From a social planner point of view, the optimal discount rate for maximizing consumer surplus and social welfare is 1 whereas producers' surplus is maximized at γ =0.1 (see Figure 8) .
If, on the other hand, one wants to maximize joint profits between the manufacturer and the discount retailer the optimal discount rate is about 0.3 (see Figure 9 ). Finally, total welfare is always higher in WM than in either B1 or B2.
Reasonable Discount Rate for Wal-Mart
In the previous section, we present how the discount rate obtained by Wal-Mart affects prices, quality, and welfare. In this section, we indirectly infer a reasonable range for the discount obtained by Wal-Mart using slotting fee information as, to the best of our knowledge, there is no such published information available.
As opposed to supermarkets, Wal-Mart does not have any slotting fees or hidden allowances (Walton, 2005) ; instead it receives lower wholesale price as a compensation for shelf space (Klein and Wright, 2007 
That is, the left hand side is a lower bound on Wal-Mart's discount to price ratio. We compute the right hand side of this formula for our simulation results (for [0.1,1] γ ∈ ) reported in Table 1 .
The second column of Table 2 contains the results of this calculation. We deem discounts rate above 0.4 as unlikely as they would imply equivalent slotting fees greater than 73%, an unlikely event. Similarly, a discount of 0.1 is equivalent to a slotting fee of 11.03%, which is unlikely given that slotting allowances are typically greater. Using this reasoning, we assume that a reasonable range for Wal-Mart's discount is [0.2, 0.4].
Using this range, the results of the WM case can be better contrasted with those of the B1 case. First, the high-quality retailer provides significantly higher quality products/services to differentiate itself in response to Wal-Mart's entry (Figure 2) . Second, retail prices decrease due to competition while wholesale price increases due to price discrimination (Figure 3) . Third, because of competition and quality improvement, joint consumer surplus and joint producer surplus are higher (Figure 8 ).
We now turn to the comparison of the WM case with respect to the B2 case. First, we find that quality differentiation arises in the presence of Wal-Mart. Second, wholesale price increases due to price discrimination while quality differentiation (and the resulting softening of competition) pushes retail prices up (except for p L when γ = 0.4). That is, Wal-Mart's lower price in the case of replacing an existing supermarket occurs as long as the discount rate is relatively large (γ = 0.4). Third, in terms of welfare, consumer surplus and producer surplus are higher except for consumer surplus when γ = 0.3. A closer look at the components of consumer surplus reveals that the high-quality consumers get a larger portion of the increase in consumer surplus, a result of quality improvement. Our results suggest that when the discount rate is relatively small, the increase in welfare by low-quality consumers may not be as high as usually expected or claimed.
Our overall interpretation of the model indicates that Wal-Mart's entry into a market whether by replacing a traditional retailer (WM vs. B2) or as a new entrant (WM vs. B1) is likely to positively affect total welfare (Figure 8 ). We next turn our attention to several robustness checks of our findings.
Robustness
To make our model tractable we made two important assumptions (1) consumer's price sensitivity (x) is assumed to be equal to 1 in y k xp θ + − , and (2) the coefficient of quality improvement cost for Wal-Mart (c L ) is equal to 1. In this section we vary x and c L to investigate whether and how our main findings remain.
First, we assume a price sensitivity parameter of x = 2. The results for [0, 0.3] γ ∈ are presented in Table 3 . When consumers are more sensitive to price, we observe that a) the quality of service for the high-quality retailer is lower (although still higher than Wal-Mart's for [0.1, 0.3] γ ∈ ), b) the wholesale and retail prices are all lower (B1, B2 and WM cases), c) WalMart's price falls below that observed in B2 when γ = 0.3 (as opposed to 0.4 when x = 1); and d) the low-(high-) quality demand increases (decreases). Therefore, compared with results obtained for x = 1, low-quality consumers' welfare is higher (due to lower prices) whereas high-quality customers' welfare is smaller due to a smaller quality improvement; total consumer surplus may be higher or smaller, but both producer surplus and total welfare are smaller.
The intuition for these results is as follows. When faced with more price sensitive consumers, the high-quality retailer's incentives to improve quality erode; instead it has an added incentive to compete with the low-quality retailer via more aggressive pricing. Low-quality consumers gain at expense of the high-quality ones. The important finding is that, our main results remain (qualitatively) unchanged when we allow for more price sensitive consumers.
Nevertheless, these results indicate that price sensitivity is an important factor in the model.
Next we explore the effect of different quality improvement costs for Wal-Mart (c L ).
Consistent with our assumption that 1
L H c c ≥ = , we vary c L from 1 to 2 by 0.1 increments, and investigate its effects on the equilibrium quality levels. Because the optimal k L for all [0.2,1] γ ∈ is equal to 1 when c L = 1, increases in Wal-Mart's quality improvement costs do not change Wal- 
On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect some impacts of changes in c L on equilibrium k L for γ = 0.1 as the optimal k L is greater than 1 in this case (see Tables 1 and 3 ).
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The last two columns of Table 4 show as c L increases from 1 to 2, k L monotonically decreases from 1.0441 to 1.0249; conversely, k H increases slightly from 1.4674 to 1.4678. It is reasonable that Wal-Mart's response to the raise of its quality improvement cost is more sensitive than the high-quality retailer. In the case of prohibitive quality improvement cost, i.e.,
These results are reported in Table 4 .
L c → ∞ , Wal-Mart chooses not to improve its quality for γ = 0.1 whereas the high-quality retailer sets the quality at the highest level 1.4683. As with our previous robustness check, results
in Table 4 increase our confidence in our findings.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop a simple model to study wholesaler-retailer relationships that accommodate for two key features of retail markets: buyer market power and quality differentiation. Motivated by Wal-Mart's increasingly pivotal role in food the retail industry, we study the effects of a large retail chain's buyer market power when it competes with conventional retailers. To make our model computationally tractable we make some heroic assumptions about the industry: upstream supply is provided by a monopolist, there is a single product, product differentiation is vertical (i.e. in the quality dimension), and there is no transformation of the product downstream. Despite this overly simplistic representation of the industry, our model does a remarkable job at predicting several observed patterns.
The occurrence of quality differentiation in our model is quite robust (i.e., for any discount rate and different assumptions). This is consistent with McWilliams (2007) supermarkets to enhance the quality of the shopping experience by adding features like high-end private-label brands, deli, coffee shop, gourmet section, and gas station.
Our framework also sheds light on a much debated issue of cost savings pass-through.
The usual argument used by Wal-Mart advocates is that consumers are better off because they can purchase at lower prices. We find that indeed this effect can be present, but when firms have the option of being "different" from Wal-Mart they choose to do so thereby undermining otherwise more aggressive price competition (and therefore lower equilibrium prices). This prediction is consistent with recent findings; Basker and Noel (2009) who report that Wal-Mart's entry triggers different price responses from incumbent grocery stores: high-end grocery stores'
(such as Kroger) price reductions are less than half the size of those reported at low-end grocery stores. Put differently, Wal-Mart's price effect will be larger in markets where low-quality stores already exist.
In general, we find that total welfare increases with the presence of buyer market power.
However, while consumers gain, most of the welfare increases are realized at the firm level. In particular, the biggest winner is the wholesaler who can profitably engage in price discrimination between the low-quality and the high-quality retailers.
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While not explicitly modeled, our framework captures the essence of other variants. A wholesaler-retailer relationship can be more efficient in the presence of a large, sophisticated retailer. For example, Wal-Mart's size can guarantee economies of scale in shipping. Also, recent technology innovations (such as radio frequency identification) that can be implemented in large and stable wholesaler-retailer relations can reduce inventory management costs.
Further, consumers' gain is unevenly distributed, with the more high-quality concerned consumers earning a larger share of the gain.
Theoretically, a more (or less) cost-effective supply chain relationship will be captured by our model by appropriately modifying the discount factor.
There are some caveats, however. ), which might be a short-run phenomenon. In the short-run, when firms cannot change the quality level, the entry of Wal-Mart would surely decrease prices. However, in the long-run, when firms are able to adjust quality, it is possible that Wal-Mart would choose to raise prices. Gregory (2009) reports that Wal-Mart is currently in the beginning stages of a strategy remodeling effort, called "Project Impact." The Project is aimed at building up "cleaner, less cluttered stores that will improve the shopping experience, friendlier customer service, and focus on categories where the competition can be killed." Also, Wal-Mart's impacts on welfare are more complex than what the current model is able to capture; our approach is silent about the effects on the labor market, the local economy, traffic, pollution, etc. Our model considers a monopoly upstream, but with several sellers of a differentiated good upstream (e.g. some large, some small) buyer market power can foreclose smaller competitors thereby reducing varieties for the end consumers.
As consolidation of retailers continues to increase, so does their seller market power. A valid concern is that the welfare loss due to the consolidation may dominate the gains associated with buyer market power. Although our model focuses on concentrated retail markets (with 1 or 2 firms), it indirectly addresses this concern. Since the case of two identical conventional retailers yields a perfectly competitive outcome, we can interpret it as a case of minimal concentration. Our results suggest that even an extreme move from this case to a duopoly where Wal-Mart operates, the buyer market power gains outweigh the potential losses due to seller market power.
In 2003, R. Hewitt Pate, the Justice Department's antitrust chief, told a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing that: "…price fixing and other forms of collusion are just as unlawful when the victims are sellers rather than buyers," when referring to cases of large downstream firms forcing upstream suppliers to lower their prices (Wilke, 2004) . While there are several important aspects of the real world that our model does not capture (as noted above), our generally positive assessment of buyer market power suggests that the antitrust authorities' view (as depicted in the statement above) may need to be carefully rethought.
Finally, several extensions to our model may be worth exploring. Our assumption of an exogenous discount rate can be relaxed by exploring the optimal discount rate between the wholesaler and the large retailer using a Nash bargaining approach. Alternatively, discounts can be endogenously determined by allowing the upstream market structure to be non-monopolistic (as in Snyder, 1996) . Finally, in many rural areas of the U.S. there was no retailer before WalMart came into town. A natural extension can study entry deterrence strategies by Wal-Mart. Notes: * This row represents base case 1 (B1), where there is only one conventional retailer in the market (variables are denoted by B1 with either a superscript or in parentheses). ** This row represents base case 2 (B2), where there are two conventional retailers in the market. *** These rows denote the Wal-Mart case (WM), where one of the two retailers is able to get a positive discount from the manufacturer.
γ : discount rate (buyer market power measure) offered to the low-quality retailer.
k L and k H : low-and high -quality retail quality levels, respectively. w : wholesale price. p L and p H : low-and high -quality retail prices, respectively.
CS L and CS H : consumer surplus for low-and high-quality groups, respectively.
π M , π L , and π H : profits for wholesaler, low-and high-quality retailers, respectively CS = CS L + CS H : total consumer surplus.
TW= CS + PS: total welfare. Note: Ratios (second column) are derived using the wholesale prices (w) and low-quality retailer prices (p L ) reported in table 1. Note: See Table 1 for explanation of notation. x is consumer's price sensitivity measure. w and (1-γ) w: wholesale price for high-quality retailer and discounted wholesale price for low-quality retailer, respectively; p B1 and w B1 : retail and wholesale prices, respectively, in the B1 case. B1 case: only one conventional retailer in the market (i.e. with no buyer market power) B2 case: two conventional retailers in the market. 0 γ > corresponds to the WM case (one conventional retailer and one Wal-Mart store). 
Figure 7: Producer Surplus
Note: π M , π H , and π L : profits for wholesaler, high-and low-quality retailers, respectively; π M(B1) and π B1 : profits for wholesaler and retailer, respectively, in the B1 case.
B1 case: only one conventional retailer in the market (i.e. with no buyer market power) B2 case: two conventional retailers in the market. 0 γ > corresponds to the WM case (one conventional retailer and one Wal-Mart store). 
